The top trumps of time:Factors motivating the resolution of temporal ambiguity

What factors motivate our understanding of metaphoric statements about time? English exhibits two deictic space–time metaphors: the Moving Ego metaphor conceptualizes the ego as moving forward through time, while the Moving Time metaphor conceptualizes time as moving forward towards the ego (Clark, 1973). In addition to earlier research investigating spatial influences on temporal reasoning (e.g., Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), recent lines of research have provided evidence that a complex of factors, such as personality differences, event valence, lifestyle, and emotional experiences, may also influence people’s perspectives on the movement of events in time – providing new insights on metaphor and its ability to reflect thought and feeling (e.g., Duffy & Feist, 2014; Duffy, Feist, & McCarthy, 2014; Margolies & Crawford, 2008; Richmond, Wilson, & Zinken, 2012). Probing these findings further, two studies were conducted to investigate whether the interpretation of a temporally ambiguous question may arise from an interaction between the valence of the event and aspects of the personality (Experiment 1) and lifestyle (Experiment 2) of the comprehender. The findings we report on shed further light on the complex nature of temporal reasoning. While this involves conceptual metaphor, it also invokes more complex temporal frames of reference (t-FoRs) (Evans, 2013), which are only partially subserved by space-to-time conceptual metaphors

The Structure of Time: Language, meaning and temporal cognition

One of the most enigmatic aspects of experience concerns time. Since pre-Socratic times scholars have speculated about the nature of time, asking questions such as: What is time? Where does it come from? Where does it go? The central proposal of The Structure of Time is that time, at base, constitutes a phenomenologically real experience. Drawing on findings in psychology, neuroscience, and utilising the perspective of cognitive linguistics, this work argues that our experience of time may ultimately derive from perceptual processes, which in turn enable us to perceive events. As such, temporal experience is a pre-requisite for abilities such as event perception and comparison, rather than an abstraction based on such phenomena. The book represents an examination of the nature of temporal cognition, with two foci: (i) an investigation into (pre-conceptual) temporal experience, and (ii) an analysis of temporal structure at the conceptual level (which derives from temporal experience)

Design Features for Linguistically-Mediated Meaning Construction: The Relative Roles of the Linguistic and Conceptual Systems in Subserving the Ideational Function of Language

Recent research in language and cognitive science proposes that the linguistic system evolved to provide an executive control system on the evolutionarily more ancient conceptual system (e.g., Barsalou et al. 2008; Bergen 2012; Evans 2009, 2015a, b). In short, the claim is that embodied representations in the linguistic system interface with non-linguistic representations in the conceptual system, facilitating rich meanings, or simulations, enabling linguistically-mediated communication. In this paper I build on these proposals by examining the nature of what I identify as design features for this control system. In particular, I address how the ideational function of language—our ability to deploy linguistic symbols to convey meanings of great complexity—is facilitated. The central proposal of this paper is as follows. The linguistic system of any given language user, of any given linguistic system—spoken or signed—facilitates access to knowledge representation—concepts—in the conceptual system, which subserves this ideational function. In the most general terms, the human meaning-making capacity is underpinned by two distinct, although tightly-coupled representational systems: the conceptual system and the linguistic system. Each system contributes to meaning construction in qualitatively distinct ways. This leads to the first design feature: given that the two systems are representational—they are populated by semantic representations—the nature and function of the representations are qualitatively different. This proposed design feature I term the bifurcation in semantic representation. After all, it stands to reason that if a linguistic system has a different function, vis-à-vis the conceptual system, which is of far greater evolutionary antiquity, then the semantic representations will be complementary, and as such, qualitatively different, reflecting the functional distinctions of the two systems, in collectively giving rise to meaning. I consider the nature of these qualitatively distinct representations. And second, language itself is adapted to the conceptual system—the semantic potential—that it marshals in the meaning construction process. Hence, a linguistic system itself exhibits a bifurcation, in terms of the symbolic resources at its disposal. This design feature I dub the birfucation in linguistic organisation

The Meaning of Time: Polysemy, the Lexicon and Conceptual Structure

In this paper I argue that the lexeme time constitutes a lexical category of distinct senses instantiated in semantic memory. The array of distinct senses constitutes a motivated semantic network organised with respect to a central sense termed the SANCTIONING SENSE. The senses associated with time are derived by virtue of the interaction between the Sanctioning Sense, conceptual processing and structuring, and context. Hence, semantic representations, cognitive mechanisms, and situated language use are appealed to in accounting for the polysemy associated with time. The model adduced is termed PRINCIPLED POLYSEMY. The conclusion which emerges, in keeping with recent studies in lexical semantics, most notably Lakoff (1987), Pustejovsky (1995), Tyler & Evans (2003) and Evans (2004), is that the lexicon is not an arbitrary repository of unrelated lexemes; rather, the lexicon exhibits a significant degree of systematicity, and productivity. In order to adduce what constitutes a dis-tinct sense, I introduce three criteria: (1) a meaning criterion, (2) a concept elaboration criterion and (3) a grammatical criterion. A further claim is that the lexicon exhibits significant redundancy. This position is at odds with SINGLE-MEANING APPROACHES to polysemy, which posit highly underspecified lexical META-ENTRIES, such as the gener-ative approach of Pustejovsky (1995) or the monosemy position of Ruhl (1989). That is, I propose that lexical items constitute highly granular categories of senses, which are encoded in semantic memory (=the lexicon). This necessitates a set of criteria for determining what counts as a distinct sense without deriving a proliferation of un-warranted senses, a criticism which has been levelled at some studies of word-meaning in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Lakoff 1987)

The meaning of time: polysemy, the lexicon and conceptual structure

In this paper I argue that the lexeme time constitutes a lexical category of distinct senses instantiated in semantic memory. The array of distinct senses constitutes a motivated semantic network organised with respect to a central sense termed the SANCTIONING SENSE. The senses associated with time are derived by virtue of the interaction between the Sanctioning Sense, conceptual processing and structuring, and context. Hence, semantic representations, cognitive mechanisms, and situated language use are appealed to in accounting for the polysemy associated with time. The model adduced is termed PRINCIPLED POLYSEMY. The conclusion which emerges, in keeping with recent studies in lexical semantics, most notably Lakoff (1987), Pustejovsky (1995), Tyler & Evans (2003) and Evans (2004), is that the lexicon is not an arbitrary repository of unrelated lexemes; rather, the lexicon exhibits a significant degree of systematicity, and productivity. In order to adduce what constitutes a dis-tinct sense, I introduce three criteria: (1) a meaning criterion, (2) a concept elaboration criterion and (3) a grammatical criterion. A further claim is that the lexicon exhibits significant redundancy. This position is at odds with SINGLE-MEANING APPROACHES to polysemy, which posit highly underspecified lexical META-ENTRIES, such as the gener-ative approach of Pustejovsky (1995) or the monosemy position of Ruhl (1989). That is, I propose that lexical items constitute highly granular categories of senses, which are encoded in semantic memory (=the lexicon). This necessitates a set of criteria for determining what counts as a distinct sense without deriving a proliferation of un-warranted senses, a criticism which has been levelled at some studies of word-meaning in cognitive linguistics (e.g. Lakoff 1987)

Applying cognitive linguistics to pedagogical grammar: the english prepositions of verticality

In this paper, we illustrate the merit of applying insights from Cognitive Linguistics to pedagogical grammar. We do so by examining English prepositions, long assumed to be one of the most difficult areas of acquisition for second language learners. The approach to the semantics of English prepositions we present is that developed in Evans and Tyler (2004a, b, In prep.) and Tyler and Evans (2001a, 2003). This account offers the following insights: 1) the concepts encoded by prepositions are image-schematic in nature and thus have an embodied basis. In other words, prepositions are not appropriately modelled as constituting linguistic propositions or semantic feature bundles (the received view in formal linguistics); 2) an English preposition encodes an abstract mental idealization of a spatial relation, derived from more specific spatial scenes. This forms the primary meaning component of a semantic network; 3) the idealized spatial relation also encodes a functional element, which derives from the way spatial relations are salient and relevant for human function and interaction with the physical environment; and 4) the additional senses in the semantic network have been extended in systematic, constrained ways. We discuss two key principles of extension: ways of viewing a spatial scene and experiential correlation. We demonstrate the usefulness of a Cognitive Linguistics approach by examining a few aspects of the lexicalization patterns exhibited by in and the four English prepositions of verticality, over, above, under and below. These prepositions provide good evidence that prepositional meanings are extended from the spatial to abstract domains in ways that are regular and constrained. We conclude that a Cognitive Linguistics approach to prepositions provides a more accurate, systematic account that, in turn, offers the basis for a more coherent, learnable presentation of this hitherto seemingly arbitrary aspect of English grammar.<br>Neste artigo ilustramos o mérito da aplicação de conceitos da Lingüística Cognitiva ao ensino de gramática de L2. Analisamos as preposições do inglês, que são, há muito tempo, reconhecidas como uma área de dificuldade para aprendizes de inglês. A proposta de semântica preposicional que apresentamos é aquela desenvolvida em Evans e Tyler (2004a, b, em preparação) e Tyler e Evans (2001a, 2003). Tal proposta oferece os seguintes achados: 1) os conceitos codificados por preposições têm natureza imagético-esquemática e têm uma base corpórea. Ou seja, as preposições não são adequadamente modeladas como constituintes de proposições lingüísticas ou matrizes de traços semânticos ( a visão corrente da lingüística formal); 2) uma preposição do inglês codifica uma idealização mental abstrata de uma relação espacial, derivada de cenas espaciais mais específicas; 3) a relação espacial idealizada também codifica um elemento funcional, que deriva da maneira através da qual relações espaciais são salientes e relevantes para o funcionamento humano e interação com o ambiente físico; 4) os sentidos adicionais na rede semântica são expandidos de maneira sistemática e constritiva. Nós discutimos dois princípios de extensão chaves: maneiras de focar uma cena espacial e a correlação experiencial. Demonstramos a aplicabilidade da Lingüística Cognitiva através do exame de alguns padrões de lexicalização mostrados pela preposição in e das quatro preposições inglesas de verticalidade: over, above, under e below. Estas preposições apresentam boas evidências de que sentidos preposicionais são expandidos de um domínio espacial para domínios mais abstratos de forma sistemática e restritiva. Concluímos que um estudo de preposições à luz da Lingüística Cognitiva oferece explicações mais acuradas e sistemáticas que, por sua vez, possibilitam bases para uma apresentação mais coerente e acessível ao aprendiz deste aspecto aparentemente tão arbitrário da gramática da língua inglesa